INDIA PAKISTAN RELATION IN 21ST CENTURY AS NUCLEARSTATES

A SYNOPSIS

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STATE OF ART

This article looks at the origin and evolution of nuclear programs in India and in Pakistan, highlighting a certain degree of ambivalence in the politics and status of these nuclear programs in their early years, with both India and Pakistan claiming peaceful use but sensitive to the option of one day wanting to develop nuclear weapons. The United States played an important role in the initial years through the provision of technical training for would be nuclear scientists and engineers, and the transfer of technology. United States support for the nuclear programs in both these countries was seen as necessary alliance building in the context of the Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union. This included U.S. efforts to recruit India as an ally to balance the emergence of Communist China, a dynamic that has resurfaced recently as China has come to be seen as a possible peer competitor for the United States.

India has militarized its nuclear program, with nuclear testing in 1974 and 1998, the accumulation of a stockpile of fissile material and the development of nuclear weapons delivery systems, including short and long range ballistic missiles. The search for a triad of delivery systems, including ballistic missile submarines, and multiple warhead missiles suggests India is following in the footsteps of the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China. India is also seeking missile defense and anti-satellite military capabilities. Taken together these developments suggest India is seeking strategic capabilities to put it at least on a par with China and more broadly establish it as a major power. The United States has committed to assist in supporting the rise of India as its long-term strategic partner.

Pakistan has developed its nuclear weapons as part of its search to balance India's much larger conventional military, economic and political power. To achieve strategic parity with India, Pakistan has relied on an illicit nuclear technology procurement network and extensive direct assistance from China. It is seen as now having the fastest growing nuclear weapon arsenal of any state. As part of this effort, Pakistan is moving to greater reliance on lighter and more compact plutonium-based weapons and from aircraft-delivered nuclear bombs to nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles. To ensure that its nuclear buildup can continue, Pakistan has been blocking talks on an international treaty to ban the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. A longer-term concern now driving Pakistan's nuclear program is the prospect of a much stronger US strategic relationship with India driven by the United States' policy of seeking India as an ally to counter the rise of China as a potential great power competitor.

India became independent from the British Empire in 1947. One of the first acts of the new state was to establish in 1948 the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. In introducing the legislation, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru explained what he saw as the role of nuclear energy: "I think we must develop it for peaceful purposes... Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments of any of us will stop the nation from using it that way." With the U.S. atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 still fresh in the minds of many people, it is hard to imagine Nehru's suggestion of using nuclear energy for "other purposes" being a reference to anything other than India one day choosing to develop nuclear weapons.

Lacking domestic capabilities and seeking to build a nuclear infrastructure, India acquired in 1954 its first research reactor, Apsara, from Britain. It also sought training in nuclear science and engineering. The U.S. Atoms for Peace Program provided a platform. Between 1955 and 1974, over 1100 Indian nuclear scientists trained in the United States.

India acquired the CIRUS heavy-water moderated natural uranium fueled research reactor from Canada. It was modeled on the Canadian NRX reactor that had been used to make plutonium for the Manhattan Project. The heavy water for CIRUS was supplied by the United

States. The reactor and heavy water were supplied strictly for peaceful purposes. It went critical in 1960. Plutonium was separated from CIRUS spent fuel at the Trombay reprocessing plant, which India acquired in 1964: The plant was based on blueprints supplied by a U.S. company. With these facilities, India had acquired a latent nuclear weapons capability. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru chose not to exercise this nuclear option, however.

India could conceivably have acquired nuclear weapons through another route. The successful Communist revolution in 1949 in China posed a major problem for the United States in its Cold War contest with the Soviet Union. The United States looked to newly independent India as the only potential regional power able to compete with Communist China in Southeastern Asia. In 1964, concerned about China getting nuclear weapons, the United States considered helping India by providing India nuclear weapons under U.S. custody, modifying Indian aircraft and training air crews for nuclear use, and even considered sharing a nuclear device to test in India. The

U.S. eventually decided against such nuclear sharing, and Jawaharlal Nehru in any case was expected to reject such an offer.

While India chose not to develop nuclear weapons in the 1960s, despite having the capability to do so, it was also unwilling to forgo the right to do so. The nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty was opened for signature in 1968 and came into force in 1970. The treaty defines a nuclear weapon states as one that had tested a nuclear explosive before 1 January 1967. These states are United States, Russia, Britain, France and China. All other states are by definition non-nuclear-weapon states under the Treaty. India has refused to sign the treaty since it can do so only as a non-weapon state.

India eventually militarized its nuclear program, carrying out its first nuclear explosion in 1974. The test was of a Nagasaki-type plutonium implosion bomb. The plutonium was produced in CIRUS and separated at Trombay. As a result, the United States banned nuclear trade with India and led the effort to set up the international Nuclear Suppliers Group of countries to agree guidelines to prevent future diversion to weapons use of nuclear facilities and materials supplied for peaceful purposes. Among other restraints, these guidelines banned nuclear trade with countries that were not signatories to the NPT, which included India, Pakistan and Israel.

India did not carry out another test for over 20 years. Until, in 1998, it conducted a series of five nuclear test explosions, including of a two-stage fission-fusion thermonuclear weapon and a device that used reactor-grade plutonium. There is a dispute over the yields of the test in 1974 and those in 1998, with independent estimates from seismologists suggesting a significantly lower yield than claimed by Indian officials. There also has been a debate in India over the success of the thermonuclear weapon test, with nuclear program insiders making public that the yield of the thermonuclear device "was much lower than what was claimed. "This has been used by Indian advocates of further nuclear testing as an argument for why India should not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. India has however maintained a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing since 1998.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

1. Mahmud Ali Durani, (Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the role of Nuclear Weapons), Cooperative Monitering Centre Occassional Paper, The Nuclear Programme of Pakistan was created through a philosophy of'beg, borrow or steal.'
2. Carlos Lozada, (A conversation with David Kilcullen, International politic nas always revolved around the concept of Balance of Power. Although it has been defined in various different ways, essentially the term indicates the relative distribution of power among nations into proportionalor disproportional shares. Traditionally, it refers to a state of affairs in which no one state predominates over the others. In this context, prudent states that are at a disadvantage in the Balance of Power, will form an alliance against the potentially hegemonic state or take other measures to enhance their capability, which will deter the aggressor.
3. Paul McGeough, (Warning that Pakistan is in danger of collapse within months) According to Kenneth Waltz, both these types of balances, whether internal or external in nature, will incur costs.
4. Mohammed Ayub Khan, (The Pakistan-American Alliance) In 1954, it formed alliances with the US by signing the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, and later, became a member of SEATO along with Britain, France, Thailand, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand.
5. Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State India has had an uncomfortable relationship with nuclear weapons. From the early days of independence, Indian leaders, especially Jawaharlal Nehru, took a very public and very vocal stand against nuclear weapons. But Nehru, a modernist, was also convinced that nuclear technology had a role to play in national development. To a lesser degree, he also thought that nuclear weapons technology might have a role to play in national defence if efforts at nuclear disarmament should fail. These somewhat contradictory strands are still visible today, as they have been through much of the last six decades of Indian nuclear policy.
6. George Perkovich, India's Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation. Indian leaders have generally considered nuclear weapons at best a necessary evil. Prime Ministers Lal Bahadur Shastri and Rajiv Gandhi sought international solutions to avoid committing to nuclear weapons; Prime Minister Morarji Desai shut down the weapons program for a time. Even Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee, who ordered the nuclear tests in 1998, was niore ambivalent two decades earlier, siding with Desai in voting against restarting the nuclear weapons program in 1979. As a number of analysts have concluded, growing nuclear threats and a progressively unaccommodating global nuclear order forced New Delhi to move towards a declared nuclear arsenal in the 1990s.
7. Ashley Tellis, India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal As a number of analysts have concluded, growing nuclear threats and a progressively unaccommodating global nuclear order forced New Delhi to move towards a declared nuclear arsenal in the 1990s. This discomfort with nuclear weapons has defined the manner in which India has viewed nuclear weapons.
8. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, The Evolution of India's Nuclear Doctrine Much of the Indian debate about nuclear weapons between the 1960s and the 1990s did not consider how nuclear weapons might be used within the framework of Indian strategy. The arguments and propositions largely revolved around whether India should go nuclear, not what India should do with nuclear weapons.

9. Lt. Gen. K. Sundarji, “Introduction," in Effects of Nuclear Asymmetry On Conventional Balance This also coincided with greater attention among decision-makers to such questions. Both Sundarji and Subrahmanyam argued that the kind of bloated nuclear arsenals that the US and the Soviet Union developed during the Cold War were unnecessary and wasteful. Nuclear deterrence could be had at far cheaper cost, with a relatively small arsenal. In essence, as Tellis has argued, what Sundarji and Subrahmanyam were suggesting was a view of nuclear weapons that emphasized its political rather than military utility, its deterrence rather than war- fighting capability.
10. Rajesh Rajagopalan, "India: Largest Democracy and Smallest Debate India's search or an appropriate BMD system appears linked to the growth of Pakistan's missile delivery capability, including the transfer of Chinese missiles such as the M-11. As with nuclear weapons, the search for a BMD system has continued despite changes of political leadership and ideology in New Delhi. At various times, India has sought the Russian-built S-300, the Israeli-American Arrow, and the US-built Patriot ballistic missile defence systems. India is also thought to have a domestic BMD system in development, built around the still under-development Akash Surface-to-Air missile (SAM). New Delhi's decade-long search has been unsuccessful possibly because Indian decision-makers have not given sufficient thought to what kind of system India needs. Indeed, it is not clear how missile defenses will fit into the existing Indian nuclear doctrine. India's official nuclear doctrine has made no mention of a missile defence system, and it is unlikely that the war-fighting orientation of missile defenses will sit well with the political/deterrence driven sentiment that dominates the nuclear doctrine. None of the Indian governments that have been in power since 1995 have given any reason why they want missile defences, though the issue had created dissension among some of allies of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government when it included communist parties because New Delhi has been seeking to buy a US-built system based on the Patriot PAC-3. Thus India's view of nuclear weapons suggests an element of inconsistency: nuclear weapons are essentially political weapons and unusable militarily by India, but other states might not be as restrained. As a consequence, India both opposes the spread of nuclear weapons and pursues BMDs.
11. Scott D. Sagan, "The Commitment Trap: Why the United States Should Not Use Nuclear Threats to Deter Biological and Chemical Weapons Attacks," First, since India no longer has CBW, it has only nuclear weapons to deter potential CBW use against India. The argument appears to be that there is a potential that Indian territory or forces might come under chemical or biological weapon attack from a non-nuclear country or even a terrorist entity but would be unable to respond because of the earlier blanket pledge on NFU. The second reason is that these changes reflect the government's response to domestic criticism about the NFU pledge being too weak to deal with potential threats. I suspect that the second reason is closer to the truth. Once again, the timing of these changes is significant. By late 2002, New Delhi was feeling particularly frustrated with Pakistan's support for terror and India's inability to do much about it, as well as the failure of Operation Parakram (the military mobilization in 2001-2002). A muscular nuclear doctrine may have been seen as one way of responding to this frustration. On the other hand, it is unclear if the government considered the problems of what Scott Sagan had called the 'commitment trap'. Sagan had argued that making such a commitment might force decision-makers into either using nuclear weapons unnecessarily or create credibility problems that will end up diluting deterrence. This will happen because unless you carry out your threats, threats on which your deterrence depends might not be very credible in the future. Thus leaders and decision- makers have to be careful and prudent about the deterrence threats they make in order to make sure that these are actually threats that can be carried out if the contingency

arose. There is little indication that the implications of these contradictions have been considered seriously by the government. In any case, the 2003 press statement remains the only official statement of India's nuclear doctrine to date.

12. "Agni-3 clears Test; All set to be inducted into forces," Indian Express India's nuclear delivery capability has grown very slowly. Though the Indian guided missile development programme is almost a quarter centuryold, it has yet to develop a long-range missile capable of targeting all of China. Even the current underdevelopment long-range missile, the Agni-3, has a range of only 3500 kilometers which is too short to target much of China. The Agni-3 has now been tested four times, the fourth test being conducted by the Army as a user trial.
13. Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, US Crisis Management in South Asia's Twin Peaks Crisis, The Parakram crisis showed similar results. In the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in December 2001, India ordered full military mobilization. Despite some initial fear at the Indian response Pakistan stood its ground, calculating that India would not risk nuclear escalation by launching a military attack. They were right: India ultimately backed down with little achieved. India's restraint in dealing with the attack on the Indian parliament once again demonstrated the limitations that nuclear weapons imposed on India's capacity to respond to Pakistan's use of terrorism as a strategy. India used the military mobilization essentially as a way of putting pressure on Pakistan, as well as putting pressure on the U.S. to lean on Pakistan, rather than as a prelude to the use of force.
14. Mark Mazzetti and Eric Schmitt, "Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say, This time, unlike in the aftermath of the attack on the Indian parliament, the Indian government did not even appear to have considered retaliatory strategies. India's inability to respond is another excellent demonstration of how debilitating the fear of nuclear escalation has been in terms of Indian policy. As a RAND report on the Mumbai attack pointed out, "(A)fter becoming an overt nuclear power, Pakistan has become emboldened to prosecute conflict at the lower end of the spectrum, confident that nuclear weapons minimize the likelihood of an Indian military reaction.
15. Angel Rabasaetal., The Lessons of Mumbai, It would be difficult to lay on the blame for India's pusillanimity on nuclear weapons alone. India's divided government (every government in the last two decades has been a coalition) as well as indian political culture make India very risk averse. And after overt nuclearization, and especially after 9/11, any potential war between India and Pakistan raises even greater international concern than before. Nevertheless, fear of nuclear escalation probably plays a greater role than other factors in determining the Indian response. India has tried to deal with such problems in at least two ways. In the immediate aftermath of Kargil, Indian military and political leaders suggested that despite nuclearization India has the space to fight a limited conventional war. This suggested that India could wage a full-scale conventional war against Pakistan without the worry that it might escalate to the nuclear level. This limited war doctrine' appears to have been purely declaratory and talk of such limited war options died down almost immediately. It is unclear if these pronouncements were the result of any politically approved strategy; the fact that such ideas were quickly forgotten suggests that these were more personal ruminations than any state policy.
16. Walter C. Ladwig III, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army's New Limited War Doctrine" Again, after the Parakram crisis, the Indian Army came up with what they called the 'Cold Start' doctrine. Cold start was the idea that India would station sufficient troops at the border to start offensive operation immediately, without waiting for a full-

scale mobilization. Such offensives would be in the form of multiple but shallow attacks across the entire India-Pakistan border. Again, it is unclear if such plans have any political backing.

17. Mingquan Zhu, "The Evolution of China's Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy," Over the last several decades, India has emphasized nuclear disarmament rather than nuclear non-proliferation. New Delhi's pition on the spread of nuclear weapons was a complex one. On the one hand, India always saw such spread o nuclear weapons as a danger. Its decision not to sign the NPT despite taking part in the negotiations was a difficult one, reached after New Delhi concluded that signing the treaty would adversely affect Indian security especially because neither Washington nor Moscow appeared willing to provide any form of extended deterrence cover for India's security. In other words, India never accepted the idea that nuclear proliferation was legitimate, unlike, for example, China in the 1950s and 1960s.
18. David Albright and Susan Basu, "Neither a Determined Proliferator nor a Responsible Nuclear State: India's Record Needs Scrutiny," New Delhi was also quite meticulous about ensuring that its nuclear weapons technology did not reach other non-nuclear weapon states. Though there have been some concerns raised that India might have illegally acquired some technologies and materials, and that it may have been careless in ensuring the security of some of its nuclear technology, the Indian record in protecting its technology from leaking is far better than that of most other nuclear powers.

RESEARCH PROBLEM

The research gaps are mainly the following:-

- How to enhance economic cooperation and peace between and India and Pakistan.
- How role of leadership is so much important to tackle problem between India and Pakistan.
- How and why India and Pakistan became nuclear power.
- What would be the consequences at bilateral and multilateral levels of becoming India and Pakistan nuclear states.
- Great challenge in front of India and Pakistan leadership to tackle the problem.

OBJECTIVE AND MOTIVATION OF THE INVESTIGATION

1. To study the growing significance of nuclear capability between India and Pakistan strategically and economically.
2. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent is a major objective of both countries.
3. Posture of 'No First Use', nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian Territory or on Indian forces anywhere is practical approach.
4. There are different aims and objective of India and Pakistan to attain nuclear power.
5. As India seeks to establish its credentials in the international comity as a responsible nation and a growing economic power, it should also project the same by means of its nuclear doctrine.

HYPOTHESIS

1. What are the major determinants between India and Pakistan in Geo -politics.
2. Why good relation between India and Pakistan is a Pre-Condition of peace in South Asia.
3. How nuclearization of both country is a major tool to prevent large scale war.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Design of the study: The nature of study is both qualitative and analytical and the principalmethod is descriptive research. The proposed study will use document analysis method while examining various reports, agreements, joint declarations, speeches and related document of the government of India and Pakistan and other countries. .Historical and Analytical methods will also be considered. The collection and representation of information will be completely factual, reliable, qualitative, and analytical in nature.

Tools and technique:- The following tools and technique will be used for data collection for the study:

- Data for the study will be collected from secondary sources.

For secondary data:-

1. Reports and publication of national and international institutes, government reports.
2. Various research journals, newspapers, magazines, websites will be referred.
3. Documentaries and various international media inputs.

- Data will be compiled, computed and analyzed according to research methodology.

Importance of study:

1. The significance of India's doctrine is as similar as the US posture, which indicates that the sole purpose of American nuclear weapons is merely to deter, not to initiate, a nuclear war.
2. India's security needs differ in a great deal from Pakistan's, as India has to deal with a greater security challenge from China.
3. If India-Pakistan relations will be good, then India will be able to establish relations with Central Asia and will be able to do its business well.
4. India will be able to focus more on their development without any fear.

Relevance of the study and social expectation

1. India must ensure that deterrence does not fail, and that there is a clear communication to the adversary of the certainty of punitive nuclear retaliation.
2. India's nuclear doctrine should be periodically reviewed and updated, possibly every decade or so, taking into account technological developments and changes in the security environment.
3. Instead of focusing on adopting a first strike policy, India must work towards strengthening its counter strike and second strike capability.
4. India's third leg, its sea based nuclear deterrence, must be strengthened at the earliest.

FUTURE WORK

1. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent
2. Posture of 'No First Use', nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian Territory or on Indian forces anywhere
3. Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage
4. Non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states
5. In the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons.

TENTATIVE CHAPTERISATION

I will divide my research into five chapters

1. CHAPTER ONE - Historical background of Indo-Pak relation.
2. CHAPTER TWO-Nature and Approach of India-Pakistan relationship to tackle the major disputes.
3. CHAPTER THREE- Background of India and Pakistan nuclearization.
4. CHAPTER FOUR- Doctrine of India and Pakistan in security related issues
5. CHAPTER FIVE - Economical and strategic relation between India and Pakistan in nuclear perspective.
6. CHAPTER SIX- Political and cultural relation between India and Pakistan.
7. CHAPTER SEVEN-Role of India and Pakistan bilateral relationship in regional development.
8. CHAPTER EIGHT-Conclusion and suggestion.

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